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1.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012, the State of South Carolina filed a declaratory judgment action in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking
preclearance of proposed changes to state election law. Although a federal threejudge panel precleared South Carolina's voter photo ID law (the Act)I tinder

1.

2011 S.C. Acts 93.
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section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) in South Carolinav. United
States, the decision highlighted several key issues with the continued
constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA. The three-judge panel held that South
Carolina's law, as interpreted, did not have a discriminatory effect on minorities
nor was it enacted for a discriminatory purpose.4 The court relied, almost
exclusively, on an expansive interpretation of two ameliorative provisions
contained in the law. However, because of time constraints due to the nature of
legal action and the timeframe of the decision, the court refused to allow South
Carolina's law to go into effect in time for the 2012 election.6
In its decision, the court conducted a side-by-side comparison of voter photo
ID laws that have faced legal challenges in other states and, in doing so,
highlighted a major concern with section 5 of the VRA-the unequal treatment
of states and the substantial federalism costs that the provision imposes. 7 The
court's rationale to preclear the voter photo ID law, coupled with its inability to
allow South Carolina to implement the law for the upcoming election, should be
cast against the backdrop of concerns expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Nvorthwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder
(NAMJUDN'O) 8 that the current statutory structure of section 5 of the VRA may
no longer be viable under the Constitution. 9
This Note will analyze the district court's decision and compare it to
recently enacted voter ID laws in other states. The analysis will then turn to
what this decision means for the future of the VRA. Contrary to assertions made
in the district court's opinion, the analysis of the decision will cast doubt on the
continued viability of section 5 of the VRA.10 This Note will also discuss the
major federalism concerns with the VRA, as expressed by several members of
the United States Supreme Court, and address the distinct possibility that section
5 of the VRA as it stands today is no longer a "congruent" remedial measure
imposed on a select number of jurisdictions to remedy the harms presented.I
This Note will assert that section 5 of the VRA, as amended, has lost its validity

2.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 197 3 c (2006)).
3.
No. 12-203 (BMK)(CKK)(JDB), 2012 WL 4814094 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012). The threejudge panel consisted of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit and Judges Colleen Kollar-Kotelly and John D. Bates of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.
4.
Id. at *17.
5. See id. at *15-17 (citations omitted).
6.
See id. at *17-19 (citing 2011 S.C. Acts 97).
7.
See id. at *15-17 (citations omitted).
8.
557 U.S. 193 (2009).
9.
See id. at 204.
10. But see South Carolina.2012 WL 4814094, at *21-22 (Bates, J., concurring) (asserting
that the district court's review of South Carolina's law pursuant to section 5 of the VRA served a
"vital function" to ensure that South Carolina's law was not unduly restrictive and that the VRA's
procedures "did not force South Carolina to jump through unnecessary hoops").
11. See City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
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as race relations have changed in America and, thus, section 5 now needlessly
violates the principles of federalism and of the individual states' dignitary
interests in crafting legislation to provide its citizens fair and accurate voting
mechanisms. As it currently stands, the recently amended VRA may no longer
be a constitutional exercise of Congress's powers under Section Two of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Part 11 of this Note outlines past and current efforts by
states to enact voter photo ID laws and also provides background on section 5 of
the VRA and its impact on the ability of covered jurisdictions to enact new
voting laws. Part II also discusses, in detail, the key provisions of the South
Carolina voter ID law and the Department of Justice's main objections to the
Act. Part III conducts an in-depth review of the district court's opinion,
describes the rationale the court provided for preclearing the Act, and outlines
concerns about the court's analysis. Part IV analyzes the 2009 Supreme Court
decision, in which the Court asserted that section 5 of the VRA may be
inconsistent with the concept of federalism and may disturb the tradition of the
states' equal sovereignty.12 Part V describes how the Supreme Court's concerns
regarding the continued validity of section 5 of the VRA manifested themselves
in South Carolina's voter ID preclearance process. Part VI concludes the Note
by asserting that circumstances have changed in such a way that the drastic
remedial measures that section 5 of the VRA imposes are no longer a
constitutional exercise of Congress's authority under the Fifteenth Amendment.
II.

BACKGROUND

On December 23. 2011. the United States Department of Justice (DOJ)
blocked a South Carolina law that would require voters to provide photo ID at
the polls to vote.'3 The DOJ objected to the law pursuant to its authority under
section 5 of the VRA, which gives it the power to block the implementation of
such a law. 14 As a "covered jurisdiction," based on the formula provided in
section 4 of the VRA,'1 South Carolina must receive preclearance under section
5 from the DOJ or a declaratory judgment by a federal three-judge panel from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before changing any
of its election laws.1 6 The DOJ asserted, in its objection letter provided to the
Assistant Attorney General of South Carolina, that the photo ID requirement
would "significantly" burden nonwhite voters attempting to exercise their right
to vote and that the state failed to prove that the proposed change would not have

12. See NAMfUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202-04 (2009) (citations omitted).
13. Charlie Savage, US. Cites Race in Halting Law over Voter ID, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 24,
2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytines.com/2011/12/24/us/justice-department-rejects-voterid-law-iii-south-caroliiia.litml.
14. Id.
15. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
16. Id. § 5 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 197 3 c (2006)).
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This
a "retrogressive effect" on the ability of minorities to vote in the state.
marked the first time since 1994 that the DOJ had exercised its power under the
Voting Rights Act to block a state's voter identification law. 8 The DOJ's
decision to reject the South Carolina law was cast against the backdrop of eight
other states that have passed laws implementing statutes that require photo IDs to
vote in the 2012 election. 19
Following the DOJ's decision to exercise its authority under section 5 of the
VRA, South Carolina filed an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment.20 On October 10. 2012.
the federal three-judge panel unanimously overturned the DOJ's decision and
precleared South Carolina's law for any election starting in 2013.
In its
decision, the court relied heavily on a broad interpretation of the law's
"reasonable impediment" provision that would allow virtually any voter without
a photo ID card to vote if they asserted in a sworn statement that they had a
reasonable impediment to procuring the required identification. The court also
compared South Carolina's law with recently enacted voter ID laws across the
United States and highlighted the fact that South Carolina's law, as interpreted,
represented one of the more lenient voter ID laws in the country.
4. State Voter Photo ID Lays

4 Snapshot

Voter ID laws, like the one passed in South Carolina, have become a hot
topic during the recent election cycle. 4 In 2011, thirty-four states introduced

17. Letter from Thomas E. Perez. Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to C.
Havird Jones, Jr., Assistant Deputy Attorney Gen., S.C. Attorney Gen.'s Office (Dec. 23, 2011),
availableat http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/279907-doj-south-carolina-voting.htmi1.
18. Savage, supra note 13, at Al.
19. Id. at A3. Of the eight states recently passing laws implementing photo ID provisions.
four of them (South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas) are covered jurisdictions under the
VRA. See Voter Identification Requiremnents, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.
ncslorglegislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx (last updated Mar. 7, 2013).
20. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1. South Carolina v. United States. No. 12203 (BMK)(CKK)(JDB), 2012 WL 4814094 (D.C.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (No. 12-203 (CKK)).
21. See South Carolina,2012 WL 4814094, at * 19.
22. See id. at *4-7.
23. See id. at *15-17 (citations omitted).
24. See, e.g., lan Lovett, Easier Access to Ballot Is Pushed by Demnocrats, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 2012, at All, available at http://www.nytimes.coin/2012/10/06/us/politics/in-face-of-voter-idlaws-democrats-push-to-ex\pand-ballot-access.html (discussing how Republicans and Democrats are
pushing voter registration laws in opposite directions). Proponents of these more stringent laws
assert that stronger provisions are being put in place to guard against fraud at the polls and increase
public confidence in elections. See Kris W. Kobach. Why Opponents Are Destined to Lose the
Debate on Photo ID and Proof of Citizenship Laws: Sinply Put People Want Secure and Fair
Elections, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. I, 14 (2012); Hans A. von Spakovsky, Protecting the Integrity of
the Election Process, II ELECTION L.J. 90, 90 91 (2012). On the other hand, opponents have
openly criticized these laws by arguing that they will disenfranchise minority voters and those on
the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum. See AAACP Applauds the DOJ's Ruling on
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voter identification legislation, and in 2012, thirty-two states introduced similar
legislation.
In 2012 alone, fourteen states sought to enact voter ID
requirements where none had existed before. and ten states sought to strengthen
laws already in place.26 States that require voters to present photo ID at the polls
have been lumped into two groups: (1) "strict" states and (2) "non-strict"
states.27 "Strict" voter ID law states are those in which "a voter cannot cast a
valid ballot without first presenting ID." 28 In these states, voters who are unable
to present the proper photo ID are allowed to cast a "provisional ballot," which
will not be counted until the voter returns to the polling place and provides
proper identification to designated election officials, and in the event the voter
does not return to the polling location, the vote will not be counted.
States
identified as "non-strict" states provide voters with other means of casting a
ballot without approved photo ID.30 For example, these laws allow voters to
"sign an affidavit of identity" or have an election official youch for the voter's
identity. Under this framework, South Carolina appears to be a "strict" voter
ID state; however, as this Note will discuss, the three-judge panel of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia cast this assessment aside. 32
As of 2012, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, a
total of thirty-three states have passed voter ID laws. 3 Seventeen of those states
have enacted legislation that requires a form of photo ID to be presented at the
polls in order to vote; however, six of those states were not able to implement
their laws in time for the November 2012 election.34 Those states included:
South Carolina, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, Wisconsin. and Pennsylvania.35
Of those six states, South Carolina, Texas, Mississippi, and Alabama are

Restrictive Voter ID Law. NAACP (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.naacp.org/press/entry/naacpapplauds-the-justice-departments-ruling-on-restrictive-voter-id-law (quoting 'Texas v. Holder, No.
12-cv-128 (DST, RMC, RLW), 2012 WL 3743676, at *32 (D.D.C Aug. 30, 2012)).
25. Voter Identification Requirenents, supra note 19.
26. Voter ID: 2012 Legislation, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES. http://www.ncs.org/
legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id-2012-legislation.aspx (last update Jan. O, 2013).
27. See Voter Identification Requiremnents, supra note 19. The National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL) has come up with the criteria for determining what constitutes "strict" and
non-strict" states. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. see also South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203 (BMK)(CKK)(JDB), 2012 WL
4814094, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012) ("At first blush, one might have thought South Carolina had
enacted a very strict photo ID law. . . . But that rhetoric was based on a misunderstanding of how
the law would work.").
33. Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 19.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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considered covered jurisdictions under the VRA and are required to obtain
preclearance from the DOJ before they could go into effect. 6
B.

The Voting Rights 4ct

Congress designed the VRA, pursuant to its power under Section Two of the
Fifteenth Amendment, "to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting"
and create "stringent new remedies" to eradicate the rampant voting
discrimination that had "infected" the country. The Act was a direct response
to certain states, predominantly in the South, that had established a pattern of
disenfranchising African-American voters from exercising their right to vote
through the use of discriminatory devices such as literacy and character tests.8
The Supreme Court first upheld the VRA as an appropriate exercise of
congressional power under the Fifteenth Amendment in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.39 In its decision, the Court stated that "Congress has full remedial
powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination
in voting," 40 and even though the VRA "may have been an uncommon exercise
of congressional power. .. exceptional conditions can justify legislative
,,41
measures not otherwise appropriate.
The VRA establishes an effective federal systematic response to proactively
prevent the disenfranchisement of minorities. 42 First, section 2 of the VRA. as
currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), provides a national prohibition on any
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure [to] be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color.
To enforce this prohibition and also to avoid the burden of "case-by-case"
litigation, section 4 of the VRA expressly abolishes "literacy tests and similar
voting qualifications" that were considered "the most powerful tools of black

36. See Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions,U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.
justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
37. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301. 308 (1966).
38. See id. at 310-11 (citing V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION
537 39(1949)).
39. Id. at 337.
40. Id. at 326.
41. Id. at 3 34.
42. Enbar Toledano, Comment, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and Its Place in "PostRacial" A1merica, 61 EMORY L.J. 389, 393 (2011) (citing Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110. 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6 (2006))).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 197 3 (a) (2006).
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disenfranchisement" in the South.44 The VRA also allows federal examiners to
override state election officials' determinations of voter eligibility.
Most importantly in the context of covered jurisdictions and changes to
individual state voting laws, section 4 of the VRA sets forth a formula to identify
states or political subdivisions that will be subject to the remedial requirements
of section 5.46 The current formula for the VRA, as amended in 2006, provides
that all states or political subdivisions that used literacy tests or qualifications in
the November 1972 election and had less than 50% of its citizens of voting age
registered to vote or had less than 50% of eligible voters turn out to vote in the
1972 presidential election are considered covered jurisdictions. 47 These covered
jurisdictions are subject to section 5's remedial apparatus. 8
Section 5 of the VRA effectively suspends all attempts to change voting
laws in covered jurisdictions until the DOJ or a three-judge panel of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia approves the proposed
changes.49 The Supreme Court has held that the restrictions and requirements
that section 5 imposes on certain covered jurisdictions apply to both ballotaccess (e.g., voter ID qualifications) laws and political line redistricting.so
Since its enactment in 1965, Congress has reauthorized the VRA in 1970 for
five years, in 1975 for seven years, and in 1982 for twenty-five years.5 The
Supreme Court upheld each of these reauthorizations, finding that current
circumstances still justified the remedial provisions of the VRA.
Most
recently, Congress reauthorized the VRA in 2006 for another period of twentyfive years. Currently, South Carolina is one of nine states that are completely
covered under section 5 of the VRA and thus require DOJ approval or a

44. X4MUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 198 (2009) (citing Voting Rights Act § 4(a)-(d)).
45. Id. (citing Voting Rights Act §§ 6, 7, 9, 13).
46. See Voting Rights Act § 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006 & Supp. V
2012)).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). Subsequent amendments to the VRA have left the coverage
formula intact but changed the date for assessing the criteria from 1964 when the VRA was first
enacted to the current law where it remains based on statistics from the 1972 Presidential elections.
See NAAUDNO, 557 U. S. at 200.
48. See Voting Rights Act § 5 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)).
49. NAMUD-NO, 557 U.S. at 198 (citing Voting Rights Act § 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c(a))).

50. Id. (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1969)).
51. Id. at 200.
52. Id. (citing Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 287 (1999); City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982.
Pub. L. No. 97-205. 96 Stat. 131, as recognized in -NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); Georgia v.
United States, 411 U.S. 526. 541 (1973)).
53. See Fannie Lou 1-amer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-1973c, 1973f, 197 3j, 1973k, 19731. and 1973aa-la (2006 & Supp. V
2012)).
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declaratory judgment from a federal three-judge panel before implementing any
changes to existing voting laws.
C.

South Carolina's Voter ID Law

During the 2011 session, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted
South Carolina's voter ID law that proposed several changes to the state's voter
ID requirements.5 South Carolina's Governor Nikki Haley signed the Act into
law on May 18, 2011.56 Prior to the Act, South Carolina law allowed voters to
cast a regular ballot, in both federal and state elections, without presenting photo
ID.5 Voters were required only to provide a state-issued voter registration card
and affix their signature on a poll list.58 Presentation of a valid South Carolina
Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV)-issued photo ID card or a driver's license
also satisfied the requirements of the former law .59 The former law received
federal preclearance pursuant to section 5 of the VRA by approval of the DOJ
and had been in effect in South Carolina since 1988.60
Section 1 of the Act lists factors to consider when determining a person's
intent to make their current place of residence their home and "domicile" for
purposes of voting.6 1 Section 3 of the Act deals with the process and
considerations for challenges to a voter's qualifications.62 Sections 2 and 6 are
concerned with issuing duplicate voter registration notification cards and an

54. See Civil Rights Div., supra note 36. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Virginia join South Carolina as the original six states covered by section 5 of the VRA when it was
first enacted in 1965. Id. Alaska, Arizona, and Texas were identified as covered jurisdictions after
the 1975 amendment. Id. Several individual counties and townships in California, Florida, New
York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Michigan, and New Hampshire are also subject to remedial
provisions contained within section 5 of the VRA. Id Critics of Congress's attempts to amend the
VRA to keep it viable by updating the pertinent date for assessing the criteria under section 4 and
redefining the term "literacy tests" to include English-only ballots point to the inclusion of these
smaller political subdivisions under section 5 as evidence that the VRA may no longer be focused
on those jurisdictions that are actually engaging in the disenfranchisement of minority voters. See
Abigail Thernstrom, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: By Now, a M1urky Mess, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 41, 50-51 76 (2007). For example, after low voter turnout nationally in the 1968
presidential election, three of the five boroughs of New York became subject to section 5 of the
VRA even though there was no evidence of New York elections officials attempting to deliberately
disenfranchise minority voters-protected by the Fifteenth Amendment-from voting. Id. (citing
Abigail Thernstrom, Op-Ed., Energency Exit, N.Y SUN (July 29, 2005), http://www.nysun.com/
opinion/energency-exit/17784/).
55. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 3.
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id
61. See 2011 S.C. Acts 92 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1-25(D) (Supp.
2011)).
62. See id. at 93 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-230(A)-(B)).
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amendment to the procedures in place for "special identification cards" that the
DMV issues.63
Section 4 of the Act requires the South Carolina State Election Commission
to develop a system to issue free photo voter registration cards that can be used
for voting purposes only.64 Section 7 of the Act authorizes the election
commission to conduct an "aggressive voter education program" to inform the
general public about the Act's new photo ID requirements.6 5 Section 8 of the
Act requires the election commission to create a list of all registered voters who
are "otherwise qualified to vote but do not have a South Carolina driver's license
or other form of identification containing a photograph issued by the Department
of Motor Vehicles," and that list is to be made available to any voter upon
request.66
The most hotly contested part of the Act was section 5. which requires a
South Carolina voter to present one of the following five "valid and current"
photo ID documents: (1) a South Carolina driver's license, (2) a nondriver DMV
issued identification card that contains a photograph, (3) a United States passport
that contains a photograph. (4) a United States military identification card that
contains a photograph, or (5) a South Carolina voter registration card that
contains a photograph of the voter.67 The Act also includes three possible
exemptions to this photo ID requirement. First, if the voter simply cannot
provide one of the acceptable forms of identification at the polling location, then
they may cast a provisional ballot that will be counted after the voter brings a
valid photo ID to the county board of registrations and elections before the
election has been certified. 68 A second exemption is allowed in the event that
the voter refuses to produce a valid photo ID due to a "religious objection to
being photographed." 69 In that case, the voter may file an affidavit, under
penalty of perjury, affirming that the voter is the person that they purport to be;
that they had cast a provisional ballot on the day of the election; and that they do,
in fact, have a "religious objection to being photographed.",70 After completing
the affidavit, the voter may cast a provisional ballot, and the ballot and the
affidavit will then be submitted to the county board of registration and elections
for certification.
Finally, the Act provides a third exemption for voters who "suffer[] from a
reasonable impediment that prevents the elector from obtaining photograph[ic]

63. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 17; see 2011 S.C. Acts 93, 96 (codified as
amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-125 (Supp. 2011) and S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-3350 (2006 &
Supp. 2012)).
64. See 2011 S.C. Acts 94 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-675).
65. Id at 97.
66. Id. at 98.
67. Id. at 94 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN,. § 7-13-710(A)).
68. Id at 95 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-710(C)(1)).
69. Id (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-710(D)(1)(a)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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identification."' As was the case with the "religious objection" exemption, the
voter may also complete an affidavit, under penalty of perjury, and affirm that
the voter is the person that they purport to be, that they had cast a provisional
ballot on the day of the election; and that they do, in fact, suffer from a
"reasonable impediment" that prevents them from obtaining one of the required
73
photo ID cards. After completing the affidavit, the voter will be able to cast a
provisional ballot that will be sent, along with the affidavit, to the county board
or registration and elections.
Under both the "religious objection" and "reasonable impediment"
exemptions to the Act's photo ID requirement, if the county board of registration
and elections "determines that the voter was challenged only for the inability to
provide proof of identification and the required affidavit is submitted," then "the
county board of registration and elections shall find that the provisional ballot is
valid unless the board has grounds to believe the affidavit is false."
A
straightforward reading of this provision would indicate that, unless the board
has information that the reasonable impediment or religious objection provided
by the voter is false, then the vote will be counted if a proper affidavit has been
filed; however, the DOJ apparently saw it differently.
D. The DOJ's Letter Objecting to the South CarolinaVoter ID Law
Unlike South Carolina's current voter ID law passed in 1988, the DOJ
refused to preclear the Act, and South Carolina was forced to file an action
seeking a declaratory judgment in order to receive preclearance from a federal
three-judge panel sitting in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.6 The DOJ primarily objected to provisions contained in section 5 of
the Act in a letter dated December 23, 2011., In its complaint, South Carolina
asserted that the DOJ failed to take into account the ameliorative provisions
contained within the law that would "mitigate or eliminate any purported
discriminatory effects" that the DOJ identified with section 5 of South Carolina's
voter ID law.

72. Id. (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §7-13-710(D)(1)(b)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN,. § 7-13710(D)(2)).
76. See generally Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 17 (outlining the DOJs
objections to South Carolina's 2011 voter photo ID law).
77. See id. Initially. the DOJ did not object to sections 1 and 3 of the Act. Id. After
receiving further information on sections 2 and 6, the DOJ also decided not to object to those
provisions. Id. Finally, the DOJ chose to make "no determination" on sections 4. 7. and 8 of the
Act because, according to its letter, the procedures to implement those provisions were dependent
upon approval of section 5. Id.
78. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 6.
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As stated previously, a three-judge panel of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia precleared the Act; however, the panel declined to
allow South Carolina to implement the Act for the 2012 presidential election.79
The court anchored its decision in an expansive interpretation of the Act's
reasonable impediment exemption.so The court began its opinion by asserting
that the VRA "is among the most significant and effective pieces of legislation in
American history." 8 Thereafter, the court explained that the VRA's section 5
provision "seeks to ensure that the proposed changes [to state voting laws]
'neither have the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color' or membership in a language minority
group."
In its analysis, the court examined the likely effects of the new law on
minority voters in comparison to the current South Carolina voter identification
law, which had been in place since 1988.8
A.

The Court's Explanationof the Key Provisions in South Carolina'slNew
Voter ID Law

The court first analyzed the provisions of the Act and provided a brief
discussion on what constituted a valid form of identification and how a voter
could obtain a photo ID tinder the Act. 84 The district court highlighted the fact
that the Act actually added three forms of valid photo IDs that were not accepted
under the preexisting law: "[(1)] a passport, [(2)] a federal military photo ID, and

[(3)] a new free photo voter registration card."8

Moreover, the court noted that

a voter could obtain one of the free photo voter registration cards by presenting a
current non-photo voter registration card to one of the election offices that exist
in all of South Carolina's forty-six counties or for those citizens already
registered to vote, by confirming their date of birth and last four digits of their
Social Security number.86 The court noted that the Act also expressly authorizes,
in accord with the federal Help America Vote Act, that a citizen can obtain one
of these cards by presenting a "photo ID, utility bill, bank statement, government

79. See supra text accompanying note 21.
80. See supra text accompanying note 22.
81. South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203 (BMK)(CKK)(JDB), 2012 WL 4814094, at
*2 (D.D.C. Oct. 10. 2012).
82. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006)).
83. See id. at *2-3 (citing 2011 S.C. Acts 90). "By prohibiting the enforcement of a votingprocedure change until it has been demonstrated ... that the change does not have a discriminatory
effect, Congress desired to prevent States fi-om 'undo[ing] or defeat[ing] the rights recently won' by
Negroes." Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130. 140 (1976) (alterations in the original) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 91-397, at 8 (1970), reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A. N. 3277, 3284).
84. See South Carolina,2012 WL 4814094, at *2.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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check, paycheck, or other government document" that displays the voter's name
and address.
Additionally, the court highlighted section 6 of the Act, which
provides free DMV photo ID cards from county DMV offices in South Carolina,
and noted that the previous voting law in South Carolina charged a five-dollar
fee for such cards. 8 To obtain one of the free DMV photo ID cards, a citizen
can go to a DMV office-of which there is at least one in each of South
Carolina's forty-six counties-and provide proof of their "South Carolina
residency, U.S. citizenship, and Social Security number." 89 The court also
mentioned the fact that documents required to obtain these DMV cards are not
different from the preexisting law. 90 Lastly, the court noted that the Act requires
that the photo ID must be both "valid and current," whereas the preexisting law
stated that the photo ID must only be "valid."
The court then turned its attention to a brief factual discussion of the
reasonable impediment exemption.9 Following this discussion, the court plainly
and emphatically asserted that the Act would still allow citizens to provide their
non-photo voter registration card to vote as they could in previous elections
under South Carolina law.93 The court also briefly discussed section 7 of the Act
that requires the South Carolina State Election Commission to develop an
"aggressive voter education program." 94 The Act requires that the commission
provide information at local county election offices, train poll managers and
workers, coordinate with service organizations, place advertisements in state
newspa ers, and provide information about the new laws to local media
outlets.
Similarly, the Act also requires that information identifying the
changes to South Carolina's votin laws be disseminated to voters at polling
locations on the day of the election. Before the elections, the commission will
also be required to notify registered voters who do not have photo ID cards of
the availability of the free ID cards.9 7
Lastly, the district court identified the provisions of section 8 of the Act that
require the commission to provide the list of registered voters who do not have a
photo ID to third parties who have requested the lists. 98 The court explained that

87. Id. (citing Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1712
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15483 (2006))).
88. See id. at *3 (citing 2011 S.C. Acts 96).
89. Id.
90. Id. Under the preexisting law, a voter had to present proof of South Carolina residency,
U.S. citizenship, and a Social Security number, which was typically done by presenting either a
birth certificate or passport, among other things. Id These same documents would suffice for a
voter to acquire a free DMV photo ID to vote. Id
91. Id. at *2 n.2.
92. See id. at *3.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting 2011 S.C. Acts 97).
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing 2011 S.C. Acts 97).
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at *4 (citing 2011 S.C. Acts 98).
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section 8 was put in place to provide assistance to organizations that want to help
educate voters about the new law and provide another avenue for voters to get
the proper photo ID. 99
B. Detailed 4nalysis of the Act's Reasonable Impediment Provision and the
Affidavit Process
The district court focused the majority of its opinion on a detailed analysis of
the Act's reasonable impediment provision and explained that the provision
should dispel criticism that the law was too strict. 00 Pursuant to the language of
the Act, if a voter provided that they had a reasonable impediment that prevented
them from obtaining a photo ID, the voter would be allowed to complete an
affidavit at the polling location and attest to their identity. 10 To confirm their
identity to a notary or, if a notary is unavailable, a poll manager who must
witness the affidavit, the voter may provide their non-photo voter registration
card.102 Additionally, the voter must also list on the affidavit their reasons for
not obtaining an approved photo ID.10 The voter then could cast a provisional
ballot, and the county board of elections must treat the ballot as valid, unless the
board has reason to believe that the voter's claim of a reasonable impediment
was false.104 The court provided that as long as a voter "does not lie about his or
her identity or . .. about the reason he or she has not obtained a photo ID, the
reason that the voter gives must be accepted by the county board, and the ballot
must be counted." 0 The court concluded that all voters "who previously voted
with (or want to vote with) the non-photo voter registration card may still do so,
as long as they state the reason that they have not obtained a photo ID."1 o6 The
court conducted a more in-depth analysis of the reasonable impediment
provision later in the opinion.' 0
According to the court, the most concerning question presented by the Act,
as expressed by its critics, was how the State would implement the reasonable
impediment provision. 10 The crux of this issue was whether the provision
would be interpreted broadly, so as to allow voters without proper photo IDs to
vote, or more restrictively with the result of disadvantaging poorer citizens that
may lack the necessary transportation or other means to obtain new photo IDs. 109
Therefore, the court opined that the "initial rhetoric" arguing that the Act

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id
See id.
Id. at *3 (quoting 2011 S.C. Acts 95).
Id
Id
Id. (quoting 2011 S.C. Acts 95-96).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id
See id. at *4-7 (citations omitted).
See id. at *4.
Id.
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constituted a "very strict photo ID law" was rooted in a fundamental
misunderstanding of how the law would be implemented. 0 The court asserted
that the Act, as interpreted by South Carolina officials, "does not have the effects
that some expected and some feared." 11
The court related that as the litigation progressed, "South Carolina officials
determined, often in real time, how they would apply the broadly
worded ... provision."11 2 Specifically, the South Carolina Attorney General and
the Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission
provided testimony and, in an additional memorandum, submitted to the court at
the close of trial that the official interpretation of the provision
"emphasized ... a driving principle both at the polling place and in South
Carolina state law more generally ... erring in favor of the voter." '1 The court
highlighted the fact that South Carolina's official interpretation would allow
registered voters to continue to use their non-photo voter registration card as
long as they could state a truthful reason for not obtaining a photo ID. '1 The
court found that as a result of this interpretation, the Act would not deny any
citizen their right to vote as long as the voter provided the same non-photo voter
registration card that they could use under the preexisting South Carolina law.
Likewise, the court also noted that "any reason offered by a voter in an affidavit
pursuant to the reasonable impediment provision "must be accepted-and his or
her provisional ballot counted unless the affidavit is 'false."'" 6 As a result, the
court concluded that whether the impediment that the voter described was
reasonable is totally tip to the voter and not the county election board.'
The
court further explained that the reasonable impediment affidavit was in place
only to ensure that voters were who they said they were. '1 The plain text of the
provision was intended "not to second-guess the reasons that those voters have
not yet obtained photo IDs" but to ensure that the voter was not lying about their
impediment. 1 9
The court cited testimony and statements that the South Carolina Attorney
General made during the litigation that a voter could assert several reasons why
they have not obtained a photo ID.12 0 For example, a voter could assert that they

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id at *4-5.
Id at *5.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

Id
Id
Id.
See id.
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did not have a birth certificate, were disabled, or did not have a car.'
The court
also listed a host of other reasons a voter could offer for not obtaining a photo
ID122 and provided that "[a]ny reason that the voter subjectively deems
reasonable will suffice, so long as it is not false."123
The court explained that as a result of the broad interpretation of the
reasonable impediment provision, the Act would not, in fact, make it more
difficult for those without a photo ID to vote in South Carolina's elections.124
The court found it unusual that the DOJ and intervenors in the case "resisted" the
broad interpretation of the Act.125 The DOJ argued that the broad interpretation
of the Act's reasonable impediment provision disregards the statutory
language.126 The court rejected these concerns and held that allowing the
individual voter's subjective belief to determine what constituted a reasonable
impediment was "perfectly consistent" with the plain language of the Act.127 As
a result, the court accepted the broad interpretation of the reasonable impediment
provision as a preclearance condition.
The court determined that the only
additional requirements that the Act would impose on voters, which did not exist
under the preexisting law, would be that those voters who do not have a valid
and current photo ID would have to complete an affidavit confirming their
identity and providing a reason for not having a photo ID.129 However,
according to the court, this requirement would not negate the validity of the
reasonable impediment provision nor would it place an undue burden on the
right to vote.
Moreover, the court rejected the DOJ's contention that the Act's affidavit
requirement would "negate the efficacy of the reasonable impediment
provision."1
The court stated that the Act permits voters who list a reasonable
impediment to vote if they complete an affidavit, which a notary can witness at
the polling location.13
Because the affidavit requirement, as it will be
implemented, provides for notaries to be present at polling places to witness
these affidavits and because those notaries "will not be able to require photo ID

121. Id. The court specifically noted that the example for not obtaining a photo ID because
the voter did not have a car was "especially important because one of the main concerns during the
legislative debates was whether citizens without cars would be required to obtain photo IDs." Id.
122. Id The court provided a list of possibilities that could be considered reasonable
impediments, to include: the voter had to work. was unemployed, could not obtain transportation to
one of the county offices, did not have enough money to travel, had to take care of their children,
was helping family members, was busy with charitable work, or any other possible reason. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *6.
I25. Id.
I26. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
I29. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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in order to notarize the affidavit," the affidavit requirement would not have the
effect of burdening the right to vote.
Furthermore, in the event that a notary
was not available at a polling location, the South Carolina Attorney General had
authorized poll managers to witness the affidavits in lieu of notarization, which
would suffice to allow those ballots to be counted.13 4 In conclusion, the court
accepted and required, as a condition of preclearance, that the Act does not
require notaries to witness the affidavits if they are not available.135
C. Analysis of the Act Under Section 5 of the VRA
After its lengthy discussion concerning the interpretation of the reasonable
impediment provision and the affidavit process in the Act, the district court then
turned its focus to applying the two-prong statutory test to determine whether the
Act, as interpreted, satisfied section 5 of the VRA.
Under section 5 of the
VRA, South Carolina had the burden of showing that the new law did not have
"the purpose nor will [it] have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color."
The court first examined whether the Act would
have a "discriminatory effect" on minorities' right to vote in South Carolina.1 8
1.

4nalysis of the Effects Test of Section 5 of the VRI

According to the district court, to satisfy the "effects prong" under section 5
of the VRA, South Carolina had to show that implementation of the Act would
not "lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to
their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."139 In other words, the Act
could not "disproportionately and materially burden" minorities from voting as
compared to the current state law. 140
The court began its analysis of this prong by reviewing its previous
interpretation of "the expansive reasonable impediment provision" that would
allow South Carolina citizens to continue to use their non-photo voter
registration cards to vote. 14 In addressing the concerns of one particular South
Carolina voter, the court opined that the intervenor could still vote at their usual
polling place with their current non-photo voter registration card and could assert
any one of a number of reasons why they had not obtained the appropriate photo

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
omitted).
140.
141.

Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7.
Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 197 3 c(a) (2006)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id.
Id. (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
Id.
Id.
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ID.'1 The court also explained that the Act would actually "expand[]" the forms
of photo IDs that will be accepted at polling locations to include military ID
cards, passports, and new free photo ID cards provided by the state.143
Accordingly, the court dismissed the voter's assertion that they would be forced
to acquire a new photo ID card to vote in South Carolina's future elections. 144
Likewise, the court asserted that the Act would make it easier to obtain an
appropriate photo ID and cited the Act's provision that would allow for a new
free photo voter registration card and free DMV photo ID cards to support its
contention.145 These new cards would be available at every county election
office and DMV location; therefore, such availability would also make acquiring
these photo ID cards much easier. 1 6 Additionally, the court cited the Act's
implementation of section 8's education and outreach provisions that would
"encourage and make it easier" for voters without an approved photo ID to
obtain one. 14' ' Lastly, the court stated that the Act's provisions requiring the
commission to provide a list of registered voters without the required photo ID to
third-party organizations would "encourage those organizations to engage in
their own mobilization efforts" to protect minority and disadvantaged voters.1 48
The court then confronted the statistics of reuistered voters in South Carolina
who possess one of the Act's valid photo IDs.
In South Carolina, 95% of all
registered voters possess one of the required photo IDs.150 However, the court
noted there was an "undisputed" disparity between whites (96%) and blacks
(approximately 92%-94%) that currently have a valid photo ID.151 The court
opined that this disparity, coupled with the burden of time and transportation in
obtaining a photo ID, could present a problem for the Act under "the strict
effects test of [s]ection 5 of the [VRA]."1
However, the court reasoned that
even though the Act may have had problems satisfying the test under section 5 of
the VRA, the broadly interpreted reasonable impediment provision in the Act

142. Id
143. Id at *8.
144. See id. at *7.
145. Id. at *8.
146. Id
147. Id
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id
151. Id. However, this "undisputed racial disparity" asserted by the court was pointed out by
the State in its trial brief. See South Carolina's Trial Brief at 34, South Carolina, 2012 WL
4814094 (No. 1:12-cy-203 (CKK-BMK-JDB)). South Carolina's statistical research provided that
"[1]ess than 5.5% of South Carolina registered voters-149,021 of over 2.7 million registered
voters"-lacked the appropriate photo ID. Id. Broken down by race, "4.71% (91,119) of white
registered voters and 6.76% (56,770) of minority registered voters" did not have the required photo
ID. Id (citing Supplemental Declaration of M.V. Hood III at 10 tbl.6. South Carolina.2012 WL
4814094 (No. 12-203 (CKK-BMK-JDB))). This analysis would indicate that the Act would have a
greater disparate impact, by sheer numbers, on white voters than on minority voters.
152. South Carolina.2012 WL 4814094. at *8.
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"eliminat[ed] any disproportionate effect or material burden that South
Carolina's voter ID law otherwise might have caused."15
Next, the court discussed concerns that the voter would be casting a
"provisional" ballot and not a "regular" ballot. 154 The court concluded that the
word "provisional" was a "misnomer" as the ballots must be counted so long as
the voter did not lie when completing their reasonable impediment affidavit.i 5 s
Relying on a previous decision, the court held that requiring a voter to cast a
provisional ballot "does not burden the right to vote."15 6 The court also stressed
that for the reasonable impediment provision to be implemented as interpreted
and to ensure that the affidavit process does not become a "trap for the unwary,
or a tool for intimidation or disenfranchisement of qualified voters," the court
would require that a form affidavit be provided for voters and that it include
separate boxes that a voter could check to indicate their reasonable impediment
for not obtaining a photo ID. ' At a minimum, the form must include boxes to
"check for 'religious objection'; 'lack of transportation'; 'disability or illness';
'lack of birth certificate'; 'work schedule'; 'family responsibilities'; and 'other
reasonable impediment."'" 5
Moreover, the court provided that its interpretation of the Act would indicate
that a voter who does not provide a photo ID to vote and casts a provisional
ballot pursuant to the reasonable impediment provision would not be required to
"attend the canvassing at the county office when the provisional ballots are
counted" because the ballots were to be presumed valid unless the country board
of elections could show that the reasons provided on the affidavit were false.159
Finally, the district court strengthened its assessment of the provisional ballot
process as "ameliorative" by relying on the United States Supreme Court's
holding in CraTford v. Marion County Election Board,160 in which the Court
upheld a similar provisional ballot process.161 The district court characterized
the Supreme Court's decision as holding that provisional voting ballots have the
effect of "curing problems and alleviating burdens, not ... creating problems
and imposing burdens."l62 Therefore, the court concluded that the Act, as
interpreted, would not have "any discriminatory retrogressive effect on racial

153. Id. at *9.
154. See id. at *10.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Florida v. United States, No. 11-1428, 2012 WL 3538298, at *33 38 (D.D.C.
Aug. 16, 2012)).
157. Id. at *9.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *11.
160. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
161. See South Carolina.2012 WL 4814094. at *11 (citing Crawford, 553 U.S. at 199-200).
162. Id. (citing Crawford,553 U.S. at 199-200).
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minorities."l63 Thus, the court held that the Act satisfied the effects prong under
section 5 of the VRA.1 64
2.

4nalysis Under the Purpose Test of Section 5 of the VR14

The district court then directed its analysis to the purpose test of section 5 of
the VRA.165 Under this test, South Carolina was required to "demonstrate that
16 6
The court stated
[the Act] was not passed for 'any discriminatory purpose."'
that in evaluating the legislative purpose, the court was required to look to the
factors espoused in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. for guidance.168 According to the court, the first step
under 4rlington Heights was to examine whether the new law "has
discriminatory retrogressive effects under the effects prong of [s]ection 5." 69
Having already decided that issue, the court identified other sources of evidence
to "include the historical background of the legislative decision, the specific
sequence of events leading up to the law's passage, departures from the normal
legislative procedure, and legislative history, especially contemporaneous
statements by legislators."1 7 0 The court stated that to constitute a discriminatory
purpose, the legislature must have chosen "a particular course of action at least
in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects on a minority
group."1
Analyzing the Act under the purpose-test framework, the court first looked
to the stated purpose of the Act.
Under section 5 of the Act, the stated purpose
of the voter ID provisions was "to confirm the person presenting himself to vote
is the elector on the poll list." 7 3 The court stated that South Carolina legislators
continually asserted that the purpose of the Act was to "deter voter fraud and
enhance public confidence in the electoral system." 14 The court noted that in
Crawfbrd the Supreme Court stated that there was no questioning "the
legitimacy or importance" of the states enacting legislation aimed at deterring
voter fraud and that "there is 'independent significance' in enhancing public

163. Id. at *8.
164. Id. at *12.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(c) (2006)).
167. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
168. South Carolina.2012 WL 4814094, at *12 (quoting Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520
U.S. 471, 488 (1997)).
169. Id. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
170. Id. (citingArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 26748).
171. Id. (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
172. See id.
173. 2011 S.C. Acts 96 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-710(E) (Supp. 2011)).
174. South Carolina.2012 WL 4814094. at *12.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEW

978

[VOL. 64: 959

confidence in the electoral system."1' Moreover, the court highlighted the fact
that the Supreme Court declared that those interests were still justified, even if
there was no evidence of voter fraud in the state.
The district court had also
affirmed this assertion in previous preclearance voter ID cases involving other
covered jurisdictions.
Therefore, the court concluded that South Carolina's
goal of preventing voter fraud and bolstering confidence in its election system
was valid and should not be deemed pretext simply because the State could not
show actual situations of voter fraud. 8
The court next addressed the record, which indicated that statistics of
citizens who possessed photo IDs varied from race to race.179 Under the
Arlington Heights analysis, "ongoing legislative action with the knowledge of
such an impact might be some evidence of discriminatory purpose" in light of
the circumstances. so However, the district court declined to "thread that
analytical needle" because South Carolina legislators had made several
bipartisan changes to the bill-including the all-important reasonable
impediment provision and the addition of three new forms of photo ID-that
would ensure that all voters, with or without photo ID cards, would be able to
cast a ballot as they did under the preexisting law.' 8
The court discarded the DOJ's argument that the Act's passage in such close
proximity to the election of the country's first African-American President and
evidence of a contentious legislative history were proof of a discriminatory
purpose.182 The court stated that such evidence was largely "circumstantial" and
did not "overcome" the facts described, which indicated the Act had not been
"enacted for a discriminatory purpose." f83 However, the court did relate that it
was "troubled" by evidence presented in the record of an email exchange
between a member of the South Carolina House of Representatives and a
constituent, "in which the constituent referred disparagingly to [AfricanAmerican] voters who [did] not have photo IDs" and was not admonished by the

175. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196-97 (2008))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
176. Id. (quoting Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194).
177. See id (quoting Texas v. Holder, No. 12-cv-128 (DST, RMC, RLW), 2012 WL 3743676,
at * 12 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2012) ("[W]e reject the argument, urged by the United States at trial, that
the absence of documented voter fraud in Texas somehow suggests that Texas's interests in
protecting its ballot box and safeguarding voter confidence were 'pretext.' A state interest that is
unquestionably legitimate for Indiana without any concrete evidence of a problem-is
unquestionably legitimate for Texas as well."); Florida v. United States, No. 11-1428, 2012 WL
3538298, at *45 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2012) ("[T]he fact that a state has acted proactively to close a
loophole in its election laws ... does not by itself raise an inference of discriminatory intent.")).
178. Id. at *13.

179.
180.
(1977)).
181.
182.
183.

See id.
Id. (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
Id.
Id. at *14.
Id.
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representative.1
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the conduct of one
legislator and one constituent did not overcome the vast amount of evidence nor
did it affect the court's final holding that the Act was "race-neutral," did not have
a discriminatory effect, and was not enacted for a discriminatory purpose.1
However, the court did not end its analysis there and, instead, the court
proceeded to highlight a major concern with section 5 of the VRA-the
inconsistent treatment of states tinder the VRA."'
D. ComparisonofSouth Carolina'sLaw'i to Other States'Laws
The court attempted to bolster its holding that the Act lacked a
"discriminatory retrogressive effect or discriminatory purpose" by comparing it
with other voter ID laws proposed or enacted in Indiana, Georgia, New
Hampshire, and Texas that had faced legal challenges.' 8 The court concluded
that if South Carolina's law had been placed on a "spectrum of stringency," it
would have "clearly" fallen on the "less stringent end."' 88 According to the
court, some states that have enacted voter ID laws in hopes of deterring fraud
and increasing confidence in elections have minority populations that
"disproportionately lack photo IDs."189 As a result, to address those concerns,
the states have adopted "[t]wo broad kinds of ameliorative provisions" to reduce
the burden on minority voters. 190 First, states have made photo IDs more readily
available to voters by making IDs free, have expanded the documentation that
can be used to get an ID, or have made the IDs available at convenient
locations. 191 Second. states have created a method-similar to South Carolina's
reasonable impediment provision-that allows voters without a photo ID,
through no fault of their own, to still vote.
In view of these provisions used in
other states, the court highlighted the fact that South Carolina's law contained
both types of "ameliorative provisions" and, as a result, that the Act was
"significantly" more lenient than the voter ID laws in Indiana, Georgia, New
Hampshire, and Texas.
To prove its assertion, the court conducted a side-byside comparison of the Act with similar laws that have recently undergone legal
challenges. 194

184. Id
185. Id. at *14-15.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at *15.
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Id. at *15-17 (citations omitted).
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First, the district court analyzed the voter ID law in Indiana that the Supreme
Court upheld in Craiwford.
Indiana is not a covered jurisdiction under section
5 of the VRA; however, the court still found that the Supreme Court's decision
on voter ID laws was "instructive." 196 Most notably, the court highlighted the
fact that Indiana's law was upheld even though it did not have either kind of the
"ameliorative provisions." 197 According to the court, the Indiana law required
citizens to present a birth certificate (which included a fee) to acquire a photo
ID1 8 and did not include any provision like South Carolina's reasonable
impediment provision.199 Moreover, the court noted that voters could cast a
provisional ballot only if they claimed indigence, and the vote would not be
counted until the voter "made a separate trip to the county seat" after the
election.200
Next, the court looked at recent voter ID laws that were passed in Georgia
and New Hampshire. 201 Both states are "covered jurisdictions" and must obtain
preclearance under section 5 of the VRA.202 Both states' voter ID laws were
precleared by the DOJ, even though those laws only had one of the two types of
ameliorative provisions that the South Carolina law contains. 0 Georgia's law,
according to the court, simply does not allow voters to cast ballots without a
valid photo ID.204 The court noted that there was no comparable "affidavit or
reasonable impediment provision" like in South Carolina and, thus, the Georgia
law was "significantly more stringent than South Carolina's law." 20 However,
the DOJ precleared the law anyway.206 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the law as
constitutional207 and as the district court noted in a previous decision, it was
precleared "probably for good reason." 208
The court then looked at the New Hampshire voter ID law that the DOJ also
precleared)209 Similar to the South Carolina law, New Hampshire does allow
voters without a valid photo ID to cast a ballot after signing an affidavit

195. See id. at *15 (citing Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202-04
(2008)).
196. Id
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing Crawford,553 U.S. at 198 n.17).
199. Id
200. Id
201. Id. at *16.
202. See id.
203. Id
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id
207. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1345 (1 Ith Cir. 2009) (holding
that the burden imposed by requiring voters to have photo ID "is outweighed by the interests of
Georgia in safeguarding the right to vote").
208. South Carolina, 2012 WL 4814094, at *16 (quoting Texas v. Holder, No. 12-cy-128
(DST, RMC, RLW), 2012 WL 3743676, at *32 (D.D.C Aug. 30, 2012)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
209. See id.
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confirming their identity.210 However, unlike in South Carolina, the New
Hampshire law requires officials to follow up with every voter who submitted an
affidavit after the election.211 Moreover, the New Hampshire law does not make
free photo ID cards available unless the voter has a voucher exempting them
from paying the required fee.21
Lastly, the court analyzed the new Texas voter ID law that both the DOJ and
a three-judge panel denied for preclearance.
The court opined that had the
Texas law been precleared, it would have represented the "most stringent [voter
ID law] in the Nation." 2 14 The court explained that the Texas law, unlike South
Carolina's, would have required many citizens to present a birth certificate to
obtain an appropriate ID, and some citizens would incur a fee to obtain a birth
certificate.
In addition, Texas has counties that do not have a place where
voters can obtain a required photo ID, which, unlike in South Carolina, would
require voters in those counties to travel to other counties. 216 Most importantly,
the Texas law did not have a provision like South Carolina's reasonable
impediment clause or its affidavit process.217
In summarizing its state-by-state comparison, the court asserted that Indiana
and Texas did not have any of the "ameliorative provisions" that the South
Carolina law contains and that Georgia's and New Hampshire's laws had only
one such provision.218 As a result, the court opined that South Carolina's law
would impose less of a burden on voters without proper photo ID than the laws
of those states.21 9 It must be noted, however, that even though Indiana., New
Hampshire. and Georgia all lacked at least one kind of the "ameliorative
provisions" contained in South Carolina's law, all three were upheld aoainst
legal challenges, and two of those challenges were upheld under the VRA.

210. Id (citing N-H. REv. STAT. ANN. 659:13(I)(c) (LexisNexis 2012)).
211. Id
212. Id. (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260:2 1('V)(a)).
213. See id.
214. Id (citing Texas v. Holder, No. 12-cv-128 (DST, RMC, RLW), 2012 WL 3743676, at
*33 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2012)).
215. Id. (citing Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *1-2).
216. Id (citing Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *16).
217. Id
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See generally Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196-204 (2008)
(citations omitted) (upholding Indiana voter ID law against a facial challenge and holding that the
statute does not impose excessive burdens on any class of voters and that "t]here is no question
about the legitimacy or importance of the State's interest" in preventing fraud and promoting
"public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process"); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups,
554 F.3d 1340. 1345 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the burden imposed by requiring voters to have
photo ID "is outweighed by the interests of Georgia in safeguarding the right to vote"); Letter from
T. Christian Herren, Jr., Voting Section Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div., to J. Gerald
Hebert and Stephen B. Pershing (Sept. 4, 2012), available at http://doj.nh.gov/election-law/
documents/20120710-preclearance-voter-affidavit.pdf (preclearing the New Hampshire voter ID
law).
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E. South Carolina'sLaw and the Carter-BakerReport
The court also measured the Act against proposed voter ID reforms
championed by the bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform (the
Carter-Baker Report).
The Carter-Baker Report recommended that states
adopt voter ID laws and actually "proposed less accommodation for voters
without photo IDs than [the Act] provides." 222 The report recommended that
photo IDs should be free of charge and readily available, but contrary to the
South Carolina law, it would require voters to present a birth certificate to obtain
an ID.223 The court also noted that the Carter-Baker Report would allow voters
without a proper photo ID to cast a provisional ballot in the first two elections
after a law was passed; however, subsequent elections would require voters who
cast a provisional ballot to return to the appropriate election office within fortyeight hours and present a valid form of identification to have their votes
counted.
F

The DistrictCourt' Conclusion

The court concluded its opinion by contending that its comparisons of the
Act with the Carter-Baker Report and the other states' laws firmly supported its
ultimate conclusion that South Carolina's law does not have a discriminatory
effect or purpose and should be precleared for future elections.225 However, the
court refused to preclear the Act for the 2012 elections.226 The court stated that
because South Carolina would have to take "a large number of difficult steps" to
properly implement the reasonable impediment provision by the 2012 elections,
the Act should only be implemented after the elections.227 The court emphasized
in its rationale that because the South Carolina General Assembly had set forth
several deadlines for conducting appropriate education and training that would
take place over the course of approximately eleven months and because the final
preclearance had not been completed until October 2012, there would not be
enough time to complete those steps before the 2012 elections, and if South

221. South Carolina, 2012 WL 4814094, at *17. Former President Carter and former
Secretary of State James Baker issued the report. See COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM.
BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, at ii (2005).

222. South Carolina, 2012 WL 4814094. at *17; see also COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION
REFORM, supra note 221. at 18-21 (recommending provisions for the implementation of photo IDs
for voting and highlighting the fact that photo IDs are required to board planes, enter federal
buildings, and cashing a check, and so should also be required to vote).
223. South Caroli, 2012 WL 4814094. at *17; see also COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION
REFORM, supra note 221. at 19 (requiring proof of citizenship).
224. South Carolina.2012 WL 4814094, at *17: COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra
note 221, at 19.
225. South Carolina,2012 WL 4814094, at *17.
226. Id.
227. See id. at *17-18.
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Carolina tried to rush these steps, there was a high "potential for chaos."
The
court was convinced that South Carolina would be unable to "ensure proper
implementation of the multi-step training and educational process" and the even
more "critical reasonable impediment provision" in the four weeks prior to the
election; therefore, the district court decided to not preclear the Act until after the
2012 election.229 However, the court did not stop there.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH SECTION 5 OF THE

VRA

In a separate concurrence to the district court's decision, Judge Bates opined
that no one could doubt "the vital function that [s]ection 5 of the [VRA]" played
and that had the DOJ and the court not reviewed the Act before its
implementation, it "certainly would have been more restrictive.i230 The
concurrence noted that several South Carolina legislators admitted that they
wanted to structure the Act in a way that would ensure it would be precleared,
and that the ameliorative provisions contained in the Act were adopted and
"shaped by the need for [preclearance]."
The concurrence noted that Congress
recognized the importance of such a "deterrent effect" that section 5 of the VRA
embodied, and that the "[s]ection 5 process ... did not force South Carolina to
jump through unnecessary hoops," but rather "demonstrates the continuing
utility of [s]ection 5 of the [VRA] in deterring problematic ... changes in state
and local voting laws." 232 However, as highlighted by the Supreme Court in
NVAMUDVO33 and as evidenced by the district court's own decision, there are
serious concerns as to whether section 5 of the VRA remains a constitutionally
appropriate exercise of Congress's remedial powers tinder the Reconstruction
Amendments.
The VRA has been, by all accounts, largely successful.234 Following the
VRA's initial enactment in 1965. the number of African-Americans who have
registered to vote and actually voted has increased dramatically. 2 Notably, in
some of the covered jurisdictions, minorities now register and vote at higher
levels than those of white voters.236 Moreover, these successes have resulted in a
"significant increase" in the number of African-Americans serving in elected

228. Id. at *18.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *21 (Bates, J., concurring).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See generally NA/UDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 201-06 (2009) (citations omitted) (expressing
concerns that section 5 ofthe VRA may no longer be a constitutional exercise of Congress's power
under the Fifteenth Amendment however, the Court chose to decide the case on other grounds).
234. See id. at 201.
235. See id. (citing H-.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 12 13 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N.
618, 626-27).
236. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 109-478. at 12-13. 18-20, reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
626-30).
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positions. 27 However, these achievements have critics questioning whether the
VRA remains a constitutional exercise of congressional power or whether the
remedy provided by section 5 has become disproportionate to the injur to be
prevented such that the VRA has become a "victim of its own success?"23
In VAMU DVO, the Supreme Court narrowly passed on ruling directly on the
continued constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA.239 Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the majority, asserted that section 5 of the VRA imposes "substantial
'federalism costs.'2 40 These costs have, over the history of the VRA, caused
consternation with several members of the Court.241 Moreover, the Court
explained that racially discriminatory conditions that were relied upon when the
VRA was first enacted and upheld by the Court have "unquestionably
improved."
For example, the Court explained that "[v]oter turnout and
registration rates now approach parity" and that [b]1latantly discriminatory
evasions of federal decrees are [now] rare."
In addition, "minority candidates
currently hold office at unprecedented levels." 4 4 As the Court so succinctly put
it. "ft]hings have changed in the South," and the Court hinted that it may be time
to take a closer look at the continued constitutional validity of section 5 of the
VRA.245

The Court first expressed concern with the fact that the VRA "differentiates
between the [s]tates, despite our historic tradition that all the [s]tates enjoy
'equal sovereignty." 246 Though the Court agreed with the reasoning in

237. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of theNew Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE
L.J. 174, 198 (2007).
238. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 ofthe Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its
Own Success?. 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1710 (2004) (questioning whether the success of the VRA has
compromised its mission and developed a section 5 remedy that is now disproportionate to the
injury it aims to prevent); Glenn Kunkes, NoWe, The Timnes, [hey Are Changing: [he VRA Is M>
Longer Constitutional, 27 J.L. & POL. 357 (2012) (asserting that the VRA is no longer a
constitutional exercise of congressional power); Thernstrom, Section .5 of the Voting Rights Act,
supra note 54 (considering the constitutional legitimacy of the VRA in light of its rewritten form
that no longer focuses on jurisdictions that are disenfranchising minority voters).
239. See -NAMUDNO. 557 U.S. at 201-06 (citations omitted). The Court opted to decide a
bailout provision on statutory grounds, holding that all political subdivisions are able to file a
bailout suit under the VRA. Id. at 211.
240. Id. at 202 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
241. Id. (citing Lopez, 525 U.S. at 293-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 288 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment); City of Rome v. United States. 446 U.S. 156. 209-221 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205,
96 Stat. 131, as recognized in -NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (2009): id. at 200-206 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Georgia v. United States. 411 U.S. 526, 545 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting): Allen v.
State Bd. ofElections, 393 U.S. 544, 586 n (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358-62 (1966) (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 203 (quoting United States v. Louisiana. 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)).
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Katzenbach that the principle of equality of states "does not bar ... remedies for
local evils which have subsequently appeared,"24 it expressed caution that such
a "departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a
showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to
the problem that it targets."248 The Court also directly questioned whether the
"evil" that section 5 of the VRA was intended to remedy still exists in the
traditional covered jurisdictions, because the VRA's current "coverage formula
is based on data that is now more than [thirty-five] years old, and there is
considerable evidence that it fails to account for current political conditions." 249
To support this assertion, the Court provided the example that the racial gap
between voter registration and turnout is actually lower in states originally
covered by section 5.25 Additionally, the Court explained that during hearings
for the 2006 extension of the VRA, Congress was warned that evidence
presented did not discuss "systematic differences between the covered and the
[noncovered] areas of the United States" and, as a matter of fact, there was
evidence that indicated there was actually more "similarity than difference"
between covered and noncovered jurisdictions.251 Indeed, other commentators
have conceded that the most someone could argue in defense of the VRA's
section 5 continued coverage "formula is that it is the best of the politically
feasible alternatives or that changing the formula would ... disrupt settled
expectations."m
Ultimately, the Court asserted that "the [VRA's] preclearance requirements
and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions. "n' It appears
that the Court based this determination on two main concerns with section 5's
preclearance requirement, as it currently stands. First, the Court questioned the
need for these rules in light of the fact that the circumstances with regard to
voting in covered jurisdictions appear to have improved dramatically since the
VRA was first enacted.2
Second, the Court explained that these changes in
voting demographics may no longer warrant such a significant "departure from
the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty"255 and the imposition of

247. Id. (alternation in original) (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328 29) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 203-04 (citing EDWARD BLUM & LAUREN CAMPBELL, Am. ENTER. INST.,
ASSESSMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS PROGRESS IN JURISDICTIONS COVERED UNDER SECTION FIVE OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 4-5 (2006)).

251. Id. at 204 (quoting he Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance:Hearing Befbre
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10 (2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
252. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Persily, supra note 237, at 208) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
253. Id. (emphasis added).
254. See id. at 203.

255. Id.
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"substantial 'federalism costs."
The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia's decision to preclear South Carolina's voter ID law was a
prime example of these concerns and should invite a deeper inquiry into the
continued constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA.
V. PRECLEARANCE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA VOTER ID LAW IN LIGHT OF
IV 4MUDNO

In preclearing the South Carolina voter ID law, the three-judge panel of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia focused its analysis on
two main issues to bolster its decision: (1) the expansive interpretation of the
reasonable impediment provision as interpreted by South Carolina's officials257
and (2) a comparison of the South Carolina law with other states' similar laws
that faced legal challenges.
When viewed in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in NA4AUDNO, the district court's decision highlights major concerns
with the continued constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA.
A.

"Things Have Changedin the South"

The Supreme Court, in its decision in N4AMUDNO, expressly stated that
circumstances and conditions that were a prerequisite in upholding the "statutory
scheme" of the VRA have "unquestionably improved." 5 As a result, the Court
provided that though these improvements may be "insufficient and that
conditions continue to warrant preclearance tinder the [VRA]," the burdens
imposed by the VRA "must be justified by current needs."260 The Court
expressed concern that the "evil" that section 5 of the VRA was enacted to
remedy may no longer exist "in the j urisdictions singled out for preclearance."261
The Court highlighted the fact that the current coverage formula, under the VRA,
is based on data from 1972 and that current conditions in these jurisdictions may
not warrant continued coverage under the VRA.262
Indeed, the congressional record indicates that in some covered jurisdictions,
"[African-American] turnout exceeded that of whites."26
Even more
importantly, as evidence of those covered jurisdictions' new understanding, the
rates of DOJ denials to preclearance submissions have declined over the years.264

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 202 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.D.
AMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202.
Id. at 203.

261. Id.
262. See id.
263. Persily, supra note 237, at 196-97 (citing S. REP. NO. 109-295, at II (2006)) (emphasis
added).
264. Id. at 199-200.
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Even though there has been an increase in the number of preclearance requests,
the "rate and absolute number" of DOJ preclearance denials has declined.26
As evidence of this change in circumstances since the VRA was first
enacted, one need look no further than the state of South Carolina. In South
Carolina, an estimated 37.3% of African-Americans were registered to vote as of
March 1965. before the VRA was enacted; however, that figure rose
dramatically, to 51.2%, by September 1967.266 The percentage gap between
African-American and white registered voters shrunk during that same time
period from 38.4% to 30.5 %.267 Today, it can be argued that these numbers are
an even more astounding and shining example of the immense success of the
VRA and a resounding indication that it is time to reexamine the "substantial
federalism costs" imposed by section 5 of the VRA. In the 2008 presidential
election, an estimated 76.1% of African-Americans in South Carolina were
registered to vote, and 72.6% of African-Americans registered actually voted in
the election.268 The estimated percentage gap between African-American and
white registered voters actually javored African-American voters by 2.7%
(estimated 76.1% of African-American citizens registered to vote versus 73.4%
of white, non-Hispanic citizens), and only 63.5% of those registered white, nonHispanic voters actually voted in the election.269 It appears that things have
drastically changed in the South.
In its decision to preclear the Act, the district court relied heavily on the
"extremely broad interpretation of the reasonable impediment provision" that
would make it less difficult for those "voters with a non-photo voter registration
card (and without photo ID) to vote as they could under [preexisting] law."270
The court lauded South Carolina officials' focus on interpreting the reasonable
impediment provision so as to "err[] in favor of the voter."
Indeed, the
reasonable impediment provision, as interpreted, did not make it more difficult
for citizens to cast a vote at the polls, as some critics feared, but was rather
geared toward ensuring that those casting a vote were who they purported to
be.27 2 This interpretation is further evidence of a greater understanding by
covered jurisdictions of what is required in drafting legislation to ensure that

265. Id. at 199.
266. U.S. CONat'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 43
(1975) (citing U.S. CONN'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 222 (1968)), available

at http://wwwlaw.umarylaind.edu/Marshaill/usccr/documents/crl2v943a.pdf.
267. Id.
268. See

U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU.

VOTING AND

REGISTRATION

IN

Ti

ELECTION OF

NOVEMBER 2008 DETAILED 1TABLES, at tbl.4 (2012), available at http://www.census.go-/hhes/
www/socdemo'Voting/publications/p20/2008/tables.htnl.
269. See id.
270. South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203 (BMK)(CKK)(JDB), 2012 WL 4814094, at
*6 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012); see also supra note 122 and accompanying text (providing a range of
possibilities that could be listed as a reasonable impediment).
271. See South Carolina.2012 WL 4814094. at *5.
272. See supra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
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voters are not disenfranchised from engaging in the electoral process by enactin
expansive provisions that would mitigate any burden on the right to vote.
Moreover, it is proof that South Carolina is enacting laws that are less stringent
than their noncovered counterparts,274 and it can be argued that these states are
now setting the standard for future effective legislation to protect voters who
exercise their voting rights while, at the same time, ensuring public confidence in
the electoral process and deterring fraud at the polls. This by-product of section
5's deterrent effect has come at a significant and protracted price,
and it
warrants a serious analysis of whether the VRA's benefits still continue to
outweigh such massive costs.
B. A Continuing Departurefrom "Equal Sovereignty" and the Principles
ofFederalism
The concept of "equal sovereignty" rests on the principle that when a new
state is admitted into the Union, it is provided all the powers that were afforded
to the original states, and those powers may not be "diminished or impaired" by
conditions under which the new state entered the Union.276 As a result, no state
can be "deprived of any of the power constitutionally possessed by other
This doctrine does not
[s]tates" so as to place them on unequal footing.)
prevent Congress from enacting remedial measures for specific geographic
locations to remedy "local evils which have subsequently appeared."278
However, as Chief Justice Roberts noted in his majority opinion in NAMUDNO,
"a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a
showing that a statute's dis arate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to
the problem that it targets." 7 Indeed, in 1966, when the Court first upheld the
VRA, it conceded that such legislation was "an uncommon exercise of
congressional power" that was justified tinder the "exceptional conditions" that
existed at the time.28 0 This point is an especially relevant one to consider when
dealing with state voting requirements and qualifications, where "[n]o function is

273. See supra Part ID and text accompanying note 264.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 195 200 (comparing the reasonable impediment
provision and provisional ballot procedures in South Carolina with the voter ID law in Indiana,
wlhich the United States Supreme Court upheld even though it had neither kind of ameliorative
provision).
275. See NAMfUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009) (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S.
266, 282 (1999)).
276. 72 AM. JLR. 2D States, Etc. § 17 (2012) (citing Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565,
593 (1918); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir. 1985)).
277. E.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 570 (1911) (holding that a condition in the enabling
act admitting Oklahoma to the Union stating that the state could not change the location of its
capital city until a specified time after admission was not enforceable under the constitutional
doctrine of equality of the states).
278. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 338 U.S. 301, 328 29 (1966).
279. NAMUDNO0, 557 U.S. at 203.
280. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334.
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more essential to the separate and independent existence of the States ... than
the power [for the States] to determine within the limits of the Constitution the
qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices." 281
There is no doubt that initially the VRA was a proper exercise of Congress's
power under the Fifteenth Amendment. 8 It was enacted against a "backdrop of
'historical experience"' with states that had a history of disenfranchising
African-American voters and were constantly attemptin to circumvent federal
laws and the constitutional ban on voting discrimination.
lHowever, section 5
of the VRA is the "quintessential prophylaxis" 284 statute created to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments by suspending all changes to state election laws,
and to remain valid under the Constitution, it must identify the harm it is
designed to remedy and remain tailored to specifically preventing that harm. 8
Simply stated. "Congress must establish a 'history and pattern' of constitutional
violations to establish the need for [section] 5 by justifying a remedy that pushes
the limits of its constitutional authority."286

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that section 5 of
the VRA is preventative in nature and affords Congress greater flexibility to
remedy and deter violations of voting rights protected under the Fifteenth
Amendment2 7 However, there must be a "connection between the 'remedial
measures' chosen and the 'evil presented' in the record made by Congress" for
Congress to continue to strip individual states of a fundamental power that
belongs distinctly to the states.288
As discussed above,289 the record before Congress when it most recently
reauthorized section 5 of the VRA did not indicate that covered jurisdictions
were still "engaged in a systematic campaign to deny black citizens access to the
ballot through intimidation and violence," as they were when Congress first
enacted the VRA.290 As a matter of fact, the district court lauded South
Carolina's new law as compared to the law in Indiana-a noncovered
jurisdiction with a law containing none of the ameliorative provisions set forth in

281. AMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 216 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
282. Id. at 217 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
283. Id. at 221 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-09).
284. Id. at 223.
285. Id. at 225 (quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 639 (1999)).
286. Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001)).
287. See id. at 223-24 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)).
288. See id. at 225 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997)).
289. See supra Part IV.A.
290. NAMUDNO0, 557 U.S. at 226 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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the Act -and yet the United States SU reme Court still deemed Indiana's law
a constitutional exercise of state power.
It can be argued that South Carolina,
a southern state, has created a more voter-friendly law that is more effective in
guarding against disenfranchising minority voters than a more northern state,
Indiana, which is not a covered jurisdiction under the VRA. Perhaps it is true
that "[t]hings have changed in the South" 293 and that southern states now lead the
way in race-neutral legislation.294 Accordingly, the question must be asked: is
the DOJ making its decision to object to state voter ID laws and submitting them
to the lengthy administrative process because of a concern for minority voters, or
is it simply doing so for political reasons? 295
Finally, contrary to Judge Bates's assertion, the section 5 process did force
South Carolina to 'jump through unnecessary hoops."2 96 This delay imposed a
"substantial federalism cost[]" 297 by refusing to allow South Carolina, a
sovereign state, to enact a law pursuant to its authority under the Constitution to
administer its elections.
Congress can no longer justify this "significant and
undeniable" encroachment on state sovereignty that fundamentally restructures
the nature of the relationship between certain states and the federal
government.299
Moreover, the lawsuit cost South Carolina taxpayers
approximately $3.5 million, a figure three times what South Carolina's Attorney
300
General had anticipatedo. Though the federal government will have to pick up

291. See South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203 (BMK)(CKK)(JDB), 2012 WL
4814094, at *15 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012).
292. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202-04 (2008) (citations
omitted).
293. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 271-75.
295. Indeed, individuals familiar with the inside workings of the DOJ Voting Right Section
reported that President Obama's political appointees in the DOJ made the decision to object to
preclearance of the South Carolina voter ID law over the recommendation of career DOJ lawyers
and supervisors who believed the law should have been precleared. J. Christian Adams, Internal
DOJ Documents Argued for SC Voter ID Approval ... but Obana Appointees Overruled,PJ MEDIA
(Sept. 11, 2012, 8:10 PM), http://pjnedia.comichristianadams/2012/09/11/doj-documents-arguedfor-sc-voter-id-approval. It should be noted that such allegations are not new and were also leveled
against the DOJ during President George W. Bush's Administration when it decided to preclear the
Georgia voter ID law in 2005 over objections of career Voting Rights Section employees. See Dan
Eggen, Criticism of Voting Law Was Overruled,WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2005, at AT, available at
http://,Iwww.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy'n/content/article/2005/11/16/AR2005111602504.html.
296. See supra text accompanying note 232.
297. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 252 U.S. 266, 282
(1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
298. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.).
299. See AMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U.S. 110. 141
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
300. Adam Beam, SC's Voter ID Suit Cost $3.5 Million, THE STATE, Jan. 5, 2013, at BI,
available at http://www.thestate.com/2013/01/05/2577507/lawmakers-approve-additional-2.html#.
UOmqi441ZaE. A subsequent court order was issued by the same panel of federal judges that
required the federal government to reimburse South Carolina for a portion of the legal fees the State
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some of the tab as a result of their unsuccessful challenge, some of the "real"
costs associated with this litigation will have to be borne by South Carolina
taxpayers.30 1
VI. THE FUTURE OF SECTION 5 OF THE VRA AFTER SouMITH CAROLINA v UNITED
ST4 TES

Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to
take up the specific question of whether Congress's decision to reauthorize
section 5 of the VRA in 2006 exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.302 Proponents of the continued constitutional viability of
section 5 of the VRA point to examples of allegedly discriminatory voting
practices303 or evidence of "racially polarized voting" within certain covered
jurisdictions. 0 4 But these concerns are a far cry from the political climate in the
South when the VRA was first enacted.30o when case-by-case litigation would
have been "woefully inadequate" to combat the pervasiveness of the
discrimination.
This is not to say that voter discrimination no longer occurs,
but "isolated incidents" of interference with voting rights have "never been
sufficient justification for the imposition of [section] 5's extraordinary
requirements."30 It can most assuredly be argued that in today's society of

incurred.
Order for Bill of Costs at 5, South Carolina v. United States. No. 12-203
(BMK)(CKK)(JDB), 2012 WL 4814094 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (No. 12-203). South Carolina had
requested over $90,000 in reimbursement back in October, but the court ruled that it was not
entitled to the entire amount. Ryan J. Reilly, South Carolina Voter ID Legal Fees Mfust Be Paid
Partly By Feds, Court Rules, HLTFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2013,
1:49 PM),
huffingtonpost.comi2013/01/07/south-carolina-voter-id n 2425076.html.
301. See id.
302. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. grantedin part, 133 S.
Ct. 594 (2012).
303. See AMULDNO, 557 U.S. at 228 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). See generally JOHN C. RUOFF & HERBERT E. BUHL III, VOTING RIGHTS IN
SOUTH CAROLINA 1982-2006, at 16 (2006), available at http:/xwww.protectcivilrights.org/pdfY
voting/SouthCarolinaVRApdf (listing several objections to changes in South Carolina's voting
laws since 1982 and other voter discrimination litigation occurring within the state during the same
time period).
304. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 228 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part): RUOFF & BUHL, supra note 303, at 46-47 (citations omitted).
305 See, e.g., A4MLDNO, 557 U.S. at 218-22 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (highlighting the pervasive and intentional nature of discrimination in
covered jurisdictions at the time of the VRA's enactment attempting to disenfranchise minority
voters, including by using violent threats against minorities trying to visit the polls, unfair literacy
tests where more than two-thirds of African -Americans were illiterate, and other unfair voter
qualifications such as property requirements, good character tests, and grandfather clauses).
306. See id. at 220-22 (citations omitted); see also Thernstrom, Section 5 of the iVoting Rights
Act, supra note 54, at 44 ("[I]t was perfectly reasonable to believe that any move affecting black
enfranchisement in the Deep South was deeply suspect.").
307. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 228 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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twenty-four-hour media coverage, the ability of states to discriminate against
minority voters on such a broad and pervasive scale, as was the case when the
VRA was enacted, would simply not go unnoticed. Moreover, those who rest
their arguments on evidence of "racially polarized voting" ignore the fact that
such data is "not evidence of unconstitutional discrimination," is not orchestrated
by state action, and "is not a problem unique to the South." 0 8
When it was first enacted, the VRA was specifically designed to attack the
"deliberate disfranchisement in the Jim Crow South." 09 This purpose was its
singular aim, and the law contained a mechanism (section 4) to identify the states
and jurisdictions that would be targeted by the federal government to eradicate
minority voter disenfranchisement. 310
At the time, the statute was the
appropriate remedy, even though it represented a "substantial departure" from
the traditional relationship between the states and the federal government.311 It
effectively attacked those jurisdictions that were systematicall' targeting
minority voters, and it was successful in addressing the emergency.
However,
after its initial success, the powers of the statute did not subside as the exigency
diminished but rather continued to grow.
Today, the VRA has a "radically revised aim" with its main purpose to
ensure "reserved seats for black and Hispanic candidates."314 The amended
VRA "rests on a racism-everywhere vision," one that was appropriate in the
1960s but cannot be reasonably argued as an accurate view of the United States
today. 315 The recent battle over the South Carolina voter ID law is proof of the
changes that have occurred in this country with respect to race relations and
voting rights, and it reveals that section 5 has outlived its constitutionality. The
three-judge panel noted in its decision that South Carolina's voter ID law was
316
one of the most lenient in the nation,
and yet South Carolina still remains a
covered jurisdiction and must submit any change to its voting laws to the federal
317
government for approval.
This "mother-may-I" requirement remains in place
in j List a few states and no longer represents a response to an emergency situation

308. Id.
309. Thernstrom, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 54, at 43.
310. See id.
311. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U.S. 110, 141
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
312. See Thernstrom, Section .5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 54, at 44 (citing U.S.
COMMN ON CIVIL RiGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 266, at 43).
313. Id. at 44-45.
314. Id. at 45.
315. Id. at 42.
316. See South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203 (BMK)(CKK)(JDB), 2012 WL 4814094, at
*15-17 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (citations omitted).
317. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 198 (citing Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5,
79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 197 3 c(a) (2006))).
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where states are involved in an "unremitting and ingenious defiance of the
Constitution." 8
For South Carolina's voter ID law, the section 5 process imposed a serious
burden on the State. South Carolina was not able to have its law in place for the
2012 election, even though it had been duly passed % the General Assembly and
signed by the Governor more than a year earlier.
Moreover, the litigation
resulted in a cost of approximately $3.5 million, some of which must be paid by
the taxpayers of South Carolina. 20 Overall, the great weight of the evidence
does not justify continuing this unequal treatment of states as if the Jim Crow
South still existed. 321 As Justice Clarence Thomas noted in his concurrence in
NAMUDNO, "Punishment for long past sins is not a legitimate basis for
imposing a forward-looking preventative measure that has already served its
purpose."322 Rather, proponents of section 5 should be championing the fact that
the provision is no longer justified or needed. Admitting that a prophylactic law
is outmoded is an "acknowledgement of victory,"3 and the decision in South
Carolina v. United States is cause to celebrate real change in the South.
John G. Tamasitis

318. Id. at 221-26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted).
319. See South Carolina.2012 WL 4814094. at *17-19.
320. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 309-15.
322. 4AMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 226 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
323. Id.
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